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Introduction
This paper focuses on the possible transfer of specific HRM practices of US multina-
tionals to European establishments. We focus on the use and spread of share (option) 
schemes in selected European regions and countries. We make a distinction between 
narrow-based schemes open to executives and management only, and broad-based 
schemes open to all employees. The literature offers several explanations for the ex-
tent of adoption of broad- and narrow-based employee share schemes. The transfer 
literature emphasises that, in their striving for internal consistency, MNCs try to dis-
seminate successful practices throughout the entire organisation (e.g. Whitley 1992). 
However, systematic national differences force MNCs to adapt to local situations. 
From an institutional perspective, therefore, it is possible to find explanations for dif-
ferences between European countries in the adoption of employee share schemes. 
Differences in cultural attitudes and institutional contexts, such as regulatory regimes, 
state involvement, industrial relations structure and tax incentives, may influence the 
adoption of HRM practices, such as employee share schemes. 
In addition, the agency theory perspective offers insight into the principal-agent 
relationships between owners (share holders) and management and the employment 
relationship between management and employees (Eisenhardt 1989). The first can be 
used to explain the adoption of narrow-based schemes, whereas the latter can be used 
to explain the adoption of broad-based schemes. Alongside this principle-agent per-
spective, a human resource perspective can offer more detailed insight into the adop-
tion of employee share schemes.
This article contributes to the transfer literature by adopting an international 
comparative approach to the adoption and spread of employee share ownership as 
HRM practices of MNCs. While most of the employee share ownership literature has 
a national focus, this contribution shows the national institutional embeddedness of 
employee share ownership in an international comparative approach, and clarifies the 
diversity of schemes currently not well researched in the literature. While research on 
share schemes is divided in two separate strands, focusing on executive type of 
schemes and schemes for all employees, this article combines the two and compares 
both schemes with respect to their respective determinants.
The article begins with a description of narrow- and broad-based share schemes. 
Next we discuss the debate on the transfer of HRM practices of multinationals. Then 
we move on to the institutional perspective, suggesting that, when entering a nation 
state, MNCs have to cope with institutional contexts that affect, or even shape, the 
nature of share schemes, their adoption and spread. We focus in this section on spe-
cific national frameworks of selected countries and specify hypotheses concerning 
adoption and diffusion of employee share schemes with these frameworks. Finally, we 
consider the literature on determinants of share schemes where an agency and human 
resource perspective is dominant in explaining the adoption of share schemes.
Narrow- and broad-based share schemes 
Employee share-ownership provides for employee participation in enterprise results in 
an indirect way; this is through participation in ownership, either by receiving divi-
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dends, or through the appreciation of employee-owned capital, or a combination of 
the two. While such schemes are not directly related to company profits, they are re-
lated to company profitability and so enable participants to gain indirectly from the 
company’s added value. Employee share-ownership can be both individual and collec-
tive. Shares can be in the company where the employee works or in other firms. How-
ever, this paper mainly focuses on those employee share-ownership schemes set up 
with the explicit intention of providing employees with an additional source of future 
earnings or income related to enterprise results. 
Employee share-ownership can take on many different forms (for a detailed 
overview, see Poutsma 2001: 10-20). Typically a portion of company shares is reserved 
for employees and offered on privileged terms, or employees are offered options to 
buy their company's shares after a certain amount of time, under favourable tax provi-
sions. Alternatively, an employee benefit trust (EBT) is set up through Employee 
Share-Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which acquire company stock that is allocated peri-
odically to each employee’s ESOP account. Workers’ buy-outs of their companies are 
a special form of employee share-ownership. 
The distinction between so called ‘broad-based’ all employee financial participa-
tion schemes and ‘narrow-based’ management oriented schemes is important. Nar-
row-based schemes are typically executive incentive schemes aimed at monitoring 
management performance. Broad-based schemes, where all employees are eligible to 
participate in the scheme, tend to be more collective and may be directed towards in-
creasing identification with the company rather than direct performance.
The generic term ‘employee share-ownership’ is frequently used in the literature 
to denote both share-based profit-sharing, and employee share-ownership; ‘profit-
sharing’ is sometimes used to refer to both profit-sharing in the strict sense of 
profit-related pay, and share-based profit-sharing. The distinction between individual 
and collective employee share-ownership is not clear cut either. In other words, the 
phenomenon of employee financial participation includes a variety of schemes that 
need to be clarified before statements can be made about the extent and impact of fi-
nancial participation. 
Most research in the USA deals with ESOPs while European research is more fo-
cused on general employee share schemes, since typical ESOP arrangements are rare 
in Europe: some of these USA schemes are related to pension savings (e.g. 401K 
plans) and these are rare in Europe. It is to be expected, therefore, that US MNCs will 
probably not transfer the ESOP type but probably tend to shape the scheme accord-
ing to national facilitated and preferred schemes or more universally applied schemes, 
like stock option schemes. In Europe, research is also more oriented towards profit-
sharing. It is also typical of Europe that discussion of employee financial participation con-
siders both profit-sharing and employee share ownership while these different 
schemes tend to be treated separately in the USA. This is probably caused by Euro-
pean Union policies combining both forms and the typical diversity of promotion 
policies for these forms by different leading European Member States: the UK pro-
motes share options savings, France promotes profit-sharing and Germany promotes 
asset savings. We will go into more detail about these differences later. Use of these 
schemes increased in the 1990s both in the US and Europe. It became common prac-
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tice in larger corporations. For an overview for the US, see: Blasi, Kruse, Sesil, and 
Kroumova (2003) and Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003); and for Europe: Pendleton, 
Poutsma, Van Ommeren, and Brewster (2001) and Poutsma and De Nijs (2003). 
HRM practices transfer 
The debate on convergence and globalisation of national economies has emphasised 
the role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) with regard to the export of home-
country policies to countries where they have their subsidiaries, especially since 
MNCs’ importance as actors in the world economy is increasing (UNCTAD 2002). 
Through the dissemination of ‘best practices’ MNCs spread managerial knowledge 
and techniques internationally (Quintanilla and Ferner 2003: 363). In order to be ef-
fective global competitors, MNCs try to replicate successful recipes in all economies 
they operate in (Whitley 1992; Bartlett/Goshal 2000; Gooderham et al. 1998) and seek 
internal consistency in their managerial systems (including HRM) throughout the en-
tire organisation (Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994; Gooderham et al. 1998). 
In contrast to these convergent forces, many (empirical) studies highlight the ex-
istence of systematic national differences in aspects of corporate governance systems 
and business organisation, that force MNCs to adapt to local environments (Whitley 
1992; Brewster/Hegewish 1994; Ferner 1997; Gooderham et al. 1998; Gooderham et 
al. 1999; Sorge 2004; Communal/Brewster 2004). Whitley (1992: 267) argues that ef-
fective forms of economic organisation vary considerably across European countries 
and that they are deeply embedded in their particular institutional contexts. These 
variations are closely linked to nation states, because these contain many of the key in-
stitutions which affect the business systems that develop in market economies. Ac-
cording to new institutional theory (see for instance Gooderham et al. 1998; Sorge 
2004), firms will conform to expectations of host countries in order to gain legitimacy 
and acceptance. These expectations emanate from the state (e.g. laws and regulations), 
other firms (especially those operating in the same field), representative bodies (e.g. 
labour unions), and public opinion. 
In recent years a large number of studies have concentrated on the role of MNCs 
in promoting or resisting convergence of HRM practices across national borders 
(Quintanilla and Ferner 2003). Of special interest is the role of US MNCs, whose 
global dominance in the world economy triggered Ferner and Quintanilla (1998: 711) 
to research a process of ‘Anglo-Saxonisation’: a convergence in MNC structure and 
behaviour around a model of international operation typical of highly internationalised 
British or US MNCs. As Ferner et al. (2004) show, US MNCs have a strong prepon-
derance of market activities on very large (mass) home market. As a result, they have 
developed distinctive ‘organisational capabilities’ in order to deliver standardised 
products to mass markets. This provides them with technical means and managerial 
experience to manage overseas operations in a centralised, formalised and standard-
ised way. This Anglo-Saxon HRM approach can be characterised as calculative (per-
formance-oriented) with an emphasis on shareholder value, as opposed to the collabo-
rative approach to HRM that is aimed at promoting the goals of both employees and 
employers (Communal/Brewster 2004; Gooderham et al. 1999). 
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Several studies have found some evidence for a convergent ‘Anglo-Saxonisation’ 
trend in the dissemination of HRM practices (see for instance Ferner/Quintanilla 
1998; Gooderham et al. 1998), but these studies also show that there are important 
limits to the degree of likely homogenisation of international HR management styles. 
This is in accordance with Rosenzweig and Nohria’s (1994) findings that affiliate 
HRM practices generally follow local practices (which they call forces of local isomor-
phism), with differences among specific practices (as a result of MNCs striving for in-
ternal consistency).  Gooderham et al. (1998), for instance, found that being a subsidi-
ary of a US multinational in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway 
normally acts as a substantial determinant of the application of calculative (perform-
ance-oriented) human resource management practices. They also found that the do-
mestic firms in the UK use these practices more than firms in the European continen-
tal countries (Gooderham/Nordhaug/Ringdal 1999). However, on the one hand they 
found support for the notion that US MNCs bring many of their own, nationally idio-
syncratic, repertoire of human resource management practices with them to their 
subsidiaries in Western European countries. On the other hand, they noted that 
MNCs are at the same time significantly receptive to local institutional conditions in 
the sense that their use of US inspired human resource practices is markedly lower in 
settings where the use of such practices by domestic firms is relatively low. They con-
cluded, therefore, that both a partial immunity effect and a partial host-country-
specific, mimetic effect exist side by side.
Narrow-based ‘executives’ schemes
Research on narrow-based financial participation schemes has largely focused on the 
merits and pitfalls of executive performance-oriented rewards. Since the pioneering 
paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) stock ownership by managers has been seen as a 
useful instrument for aligning interests. Stock options are perceived as an especially 
powerful tool because the capacity to increase earnings and wealth is at the core of 
this instrument (see Baker/Jensen/Murphy 1988). This is why firms adopt shares and 
options schemes for their executives and management. For this reason, we expected 
multinationals to adopt these plans depending on variations in agency costs. Bebchuk 
et al. (2001), however, argued that it is highly unlikely that executive options are used 
primarily for incentive purposes because options take such similar forms between 
companies (i.e. 10 year expiry terms, 3-4 year vesting periods etc.). Given variations in 
circumstances between firms, and consequent variations in agency costs, it would be 
expected that greater variation would be observed in the character of options. 
Critics have suggested on these grounds that stock-based performance measures 
may lead to managerial actions to influence the outcomes. There is evidence to sug-
gest that executive agents exploit their insider information advantages to influence the 
terms of the ‘optimal contract’, by influencing the timing of stock option awards and 
issues. There are reasonable grounds for the ‘rent extraction’ perspective (Bebchuk et 
al. 2001), which argues that in effect managers are able to award themselves stock op-
tions to enhance their returns from employment via their capture or manipulation of 
shareholder institutions such as remuneration committees.
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In addition, in the US there is a considerable body of evidence that suggests that 
executive insiders dominate shareholder representatives in pay-setting (Bertsch et al. 
1998). Main et al. (1995) found that directors who serve on remuneration committees 
are influenced by notions of reciprocity, authority, and similarity in setting executive 
remuneration. In addition to this internal pay-setting, US stock exchange rules give 
considerable latitude to firms to award options, this may boost the use of options for 
‘rent extraction’. We could, therefore, predict that there is a higher push to diffuse 
these practices in US MNCs. It remains to be seen if such practices are transferred to 
subsidiaries in countries with a less voluntary climate of pay settings, as for instance in 
Germany.
From this overview of the transfer and executive compensation literature, we ex-
pect being a subsidiary of a US MNC to be a good predictor of the use of both nar-
row- and broad-based schemes. 
Hypothesis:
1. Being a subsidiary of a US MNC is a good predictor of the use of narrow- and broad-based 
schemes.
Institutional perspective 
The literature on employee share schemes in Europe shows an increasing interest in 
the comparative incidence of profit-sharing and employee share ownership (see, for 
instance, the studies of profit-sharing in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK con-
ducted by the IPSE team1, (Uvalic 1991), and the studies reported in a special issue of 
Economic and Industrial Democracy in 19992). In general, these studies show that 
there are differences in cultural attitudes, regulatory and fiscal regimes that create dif-
ferences between countries in the use and incidence of financial participation, i.e. 
profit-sharing and employee share ownership. Uvalic (1991) found a wide divergence 
between Member States. Similar results have been replicated by, for example, 
Vaughan-Whitehead (1995) and Poutsma (2001). The general consensus in the litera-
ture so far is that variations in statutory identity and fiscal concessions have a major 
impact on cross-national variations in the incidence of financial participation. Al-
though not fully developed in the literature so far, national differences in corporate 
governance and ownership also appear likely to influence the incidence of share own-
ership schemes. For instance, share ownership schemes seem likely to be facilitated by 
the extensive use of stock market listing in countries such as the UK, and obstructed 
by the pyramidal and cross-ownership structures of corporate ownership in countries 
such as Italy and Germany.
Given the known variations between nations in institutional support for financial 
participation, we predict substantial differences between countries in the incidence of 
                                                          
1  The results are reported in IPSE (1997), and in numerous papers by members of the 
country teams. See Biagioli (1995); Carstensen, Gerlach, and Hubler (1995); Del Boca and 
Cupaiuolo (1998); Mabile (1998); Perotin and Robinson (1998).
2  See Poutsma and Huijgen (1999); Poutsma, de Nijs, and Doorewaaard (1999); Festing, 
Groening, Kabst, and Weber (1999). 
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the various forms of financial participation. These differences in usage would broadly 
correspond to known differences in legal, fiscal, and other institutional features of the 
financial participation environment. In addition, variations in national support for fi-
nancial participation may have a major impact on managerial assessment of the costs 
and benefits of financial participation. For instance, the costs of using share owner-
ship schemes (set-up costs, administrative costs, and share dilution) may be off-set by 
a reduction in monitoring costs and tax deductions (accruing either directly to the firm 
or to employees). Without tax breaks, the net cost of using financial participation may 
be sufficient to deter the introduction of a plan, especially for smaller companies.
To give the paper focus we selected a small number of European countries: 
France, Spain and Germany on the continent, and the Anglo-Saxon country UK. 
These represent the three ‘varieties of capitalism’ that Hall and Soskice (2001) distin-
guished in Europe: Liberal Market Economy (UK), Co-ordinated Market Economy 
(Germany) and Mediterranean (France, Spain). In this section we provide a summary 
of national frameworks for narrow- and broad-based share (options) ownership. The 
information is largely based on Poutsma (2001) and Pendleton and Poutsma (2004)3.
The in-depth studies of a number of countries make clear that there are quite distinct 
patterns of financial participation systems in Europe. On the one hand, this may facili-
tate or hinder the adoption and spread of the HRM practice to be transferred; on the 
other hand, this will shape the nature and form of schemes. In other words, when 
transferred this HRM practice will most probably be modified and shaped according 
to national specific ‘approved’ practices. 
France
France has a framework that consists of extensive, state-regulated (mandatory), broad-
based, deferred profit-sharing with the aim of enhancing employee savings and wider 
distribution of wealth and wage flexibility. Started by President De Gaulle to bridge 
the gap between labour and capital in the fifties, the development of deferred profit-
sharing (mandatory for companies with 50 or more employees) and Mutual Fund Sav-
ings (voluntary schemes) have been supported by French governments of the right 
and left with tax incentives. To be approved, financial participation systems must be 
agreed upon by employees or their representatives. The financial participation system 
has evolved into a system where employee savings are invested in funds, which in turn 
either invest in a diversified fund or in the shares of the employer. In this way em-
ployee share ownership has been promoted in the French system: recent evidence in-
dicates that nearly half of savings plans are used as a means of employee share acquisi-
tion (see Pendleton/Poutsma 2004 and Income Data Services 2001). In other words, 
French companies are responsive to employee share schemes provided they fit the 
legal framework and are agreed by the employees or their representatives, including 
unions.
                                                          
3  These reports contain descriptions of the situation in each country based on reports by 
national experts. We have focused on the descriptions for 2000 but do not rule out later 
developments, because the survey data we used is from the year 2000.
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Stock option legislation has existed since 1970. Until recently stock options were 
mainly held by top executives. Under the influence of globalisation stock option plans 
became more common. Most multi-nationals have these plans and approximately 50% 
of listed companies operate such a plan. However, tax treatment is not that favourable 
toward broad-based plans (income tax and social security charges at collection; see 
also Directorate-General Enterprise 2002). French companies are more responsive to 
narrow-based plans. Given the observation that French management has a tradition of 
autonomous, non-consultative decision-making while at the same time government 
sets precise rules on various labour issues (Brunstein 1995) (especially in the case of 
broad-based financial participation) we expected that the willingness of management 
to adopt voluntary broad-based schemes would mainly be based on tax incentives. 
Managerial autonomy and a strong emphasis on control (Lane 1995) may enhance the 
possibilities of narrow schemes being adopted.
Spain
In comparison with France, Spain has a framework of minor regulations for share 
ownership or share-based profit-sharing. Developments so far have not been substan-
tial. In fact, the policy on employee share ownership has been determined far more by 
concerns about the development of the co-operative sector and the social economy. 
The co-operative movement and the use of labour societies are important in Spain. 
These are gradually diffusing into small employee share ownership types of compa-
nies. The Spanish government considers its fiscal support for share-based profit-
sharing to be one of its measures favouring local employment in small-and medium-
sized firms. In public and private joint stock companies there has been not much de-
velopment in policy on employee share ownership or any substantial development in 
the uses of schemes, despite some upswing due to privatisation of national bodies. 
There are some tax exemptions on benefits from offering stock options, given a cer-
tain retention period (more than 2 years). However, since the Telefonica scandal, 
where top management made use of these possibilities to enrich themselves during the 
privatisation, regulation has been tightened up by setting a maximum amount of re-
ceived benefit4. Due to this there has been some interest in narrow-based stock option 
plans in Spain (see Directorate-General Enterprise 2002).
Spain has a long tradition of negotiations and collective agreements on variable 
pay. However, stocks (options) were seldom included in the debates. Since changes in 
the regulations in 1994, employers have been more autonomous in setting variable 
pay. Given the weak institutional structures of industrial relations and a limited coun-
tervailing power of trade unions, management has a great deal of autonomy. An in-
crease in individual contracts ‘outside’ collective agreements, mainly for management 
and higher staff, has occurred. This may boost schemes. On the other hand, as in 
France, the terms and working conditions for the main labour force is highly regulated 
and this sets legislative and administrative constraints on the personnel function, leav-
ing little scope for broad-based schemes.
                                                          
4  The amount is still relatively high. In 2000, it was about 30% of average annual salary      
(about 5,000 €) times the number of years in which the benefits are generated.
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Germany
The financial participation framework in Germany is quite different. Germany has a 
framework that consists of investment savings plans with the principal aim of 
enlargement of (employee) ownership of capital savings and other assets for the future 
security of low earners. This exemplifies German governments’ concern about the 
(re)distribution of wealth. The co-determination-based corporate governance system 
of Germany has led to the operation of agreed collective schemes. The legal frame-
work in Germany provides for preferential tax treatment on employer payments to 
various forms of employee investments. These are supplemented by a tax-free gov-
ernment savings premium. Traditionally this system has been primarily concerned 
with employee participation in productive capital in general and not specifically in own 
company shares. Since 1999 this system has been modified to favour employee share 
ownership. The issue of stock options to management and employees was prohibited 
by company law until 1998. Since this was liberalised,  there has been an increase in 
the use of stock options for management and selected staff.
German management has to face an elaborate system of industrial relations where 
collective agreements set the standards and works councils, for instance, have the legal 
authority to negotiate on agreements about broad-based stock options. Personnel de-
partments have to cope with this detailed prescriptive framework and this prevents 
any large-scale adoption of more recent international human resource management 
practices. Trade unions appear to have started discussions on plans but in general they 
are sceptical. In addition, as in France, the capital market is not very developed in 
Germany. Many firms are privately owned, which leaves little scope for the develop-
ment of full employee share ownership. All in all, we expected some favourable trends 
toward the adoption of narrow-based schemes and less development of broad-based 
schemes. However, due to the recent changes in legislation and tax and benefit poli-
cies this may not have reached substantial levels in the year of focus in this study: 
2000.
The United Kingdom 
The UK has a financial participation framework that consists of mainly deferred 
share-based profit-sharing via option schemes. An elaborated stock market provides 
ample scope for share-based investments. The development in the UK is heavily sup-
ported by UK government policy and measures (mainly tax concessions). The position 
of unions in the UK can best be described as ‘engaged scepticism’. The introduction 
of financial participation in many UK companies is kept separate from collective bar-
gaining over pay and terms and conditions of employment. This reflects both the in-
terests of managers wanting to preserve as much freedom of manoeuvre as possible, 
and trade union representatives anxious to prevent financial participation substituting 
for annual pay increases or part of ‘base’ wages and salaries. Both parties tend to ac-
cept that the legal regulations governing financial participation may limit the scope for 
negotiation over the content of profit-sharing and share ownership schemes. On these 
grounds we expect a substantial responsiveness and use of narrow- and broad-based 
plans in the UK (for further details, see Poutsma/Pendleton 2004). 
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In summary, from an institutional perspective, country differences with respect to 
state involvement (national tax incentives, legal regulations), locus of control (manage-
rial autonomy, IR structure) and corporate ownership (use of stock market listings) 
can explain national differences in the adoption of employee share schemes. Based on 
these country differences we predict substantial differences between the countries in 
the incidence of the various forms of financial participation. Since the UK is closest to 
US calculative management practices, with well developed stock markets (emphasis of 
share value) and broad acceptance of legal regulations, we expect, in general, a higher 
incidence of both schemes in the UK than in other European countries. For Germany 
we expect the lowest figures with some favourable tendencies for the adoption of nar-
row-based schemes and less of broad-based schemes. Being mainly based on tax in-
centives, we expect a relatively higher incidence of both, but especially of narrow-
based schemes in France. In Spain we expect lower figures with a relatively higher in-
cidence of narrow-based option schemes, because individual contracts for manage-
ment and senior staff are increasingly kept outside collective agreements.
Hypotheses:
2. The incidence of narrow- and broad-based schemes is higher in the UK than in other European 
countries.
3. The incidence of narrow- and broad-based schemes tends to be lower in Germany than in the 
other selected countries. 
Determinants from employee share ownership literature 
Two perspectives are widely used in the literature on employee share ownership: the 
agency perspective and the human resource perspective. Research into financial par-
ticipation using the agency perspective is reported on in two strands of the literature. 
The first tries to explain the impact of financial participation on performance (see 
Jones/Kato 1995; Sesil et al. 2002). The second, growing strand examines the deter-
minants of firms and workplaces with financial participation, using variables that 
proxy for monitoring costs in models of adoption to try to test the agency perspec-
tives (see Drago/Heywood 1995; Kruse 1996). In this paper we focus on the determi-
nants of employee share ownership schemes and we have selected additional control 
variables from this literature. 
Agency perspective 
The core of the agency theory perspective is the contract between principal and agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989). In these agency relationships, a major issue is ensuring that the 
agent acts in the interests of the principal (Huarng 1995). Agency problems arise when 
“(a) the principal and agent have different goals and (b) the principal cannot deter-
mine if the agent has behaved appropriately” (Eisenhardt 1989: 61). As a result, align-
ing goals and monitoring output are important management instruments. Employee 
share schemes are a means to steer agents’ behaviours and, therefore, can be consid-
ered as part of behaviour-based contracts if the level of alignment between principal 
and agent is low and/or if output measurability is low. Regarding employee share 
schemes, three principal-agent relationships are of interest: between owner (share 
holders) and management, between management and employees, and, in case of 
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MNCs, between headquarters and subsidiary. The first relationship is mainly related to 
narrow-based schemes (for aligning owners’ and management’s goals) and the second 
to broad-based schemes (for controlling employees’ behaviours). The relationship be-
tween headquarters and subsidiary in MNCs combines insights from MNC research 
with the agency perspective. 
Agency perspective in MNCs 
Regarding the agency perspective in MNCs, the relation between headquarters and 
subsidiary is of importance. Strategy literature distinguishes between different struc-
tures and strategies of MNCs according to their level of local or global responsiveness: 
the multi-domestic, the international and global product division (Bartlett/Goshal 
2000). The ‘agency problem’ in MNCs is probably most felt when the subsidiary plays 
a key role in the global strategy of the corporation, particularly when the subsidiary it-
self operates in a global market instead of being oriented to the local market. This will 
be the case in subsidiaries of global product divisions. Hence, their remuneration sys-
tems will be more oriented towards global corporate performance while in multi-
domestic firms they will be more oriented to subsidiary performance in the local con-
text. O’Donnell (1999) found support for this, she found that, in comparison with 
subsidiaries that have a multi-domestic strategic role, for subsidiaries with a strategic 
global role the percentage of subsidiary management remuneration was based more on 
corporate performance than on local performance. The question for our research is 
whether  US multinationals (based on their global dominance in world economy) de-
velop more global equity plans for the management of their subsidiaries with a strate-
gic role than for their subsidiaries with a more local orientation.
4. Being a global player as a business unit of a US MNC has a positive effect on the incidence of 
narrow-based schemes. 
Broad-based schemes 
The main argument from the determinants approach in case of broad-based schemes 
is that firms adopt employee share ownership schemes if direct means of monitoring 
or controlling the work of individuals is costly. Employee share ownership will be 
more likely to be used where employee efforts are difficult to observe and output dif-
ficult to monitor and it is expensive for the principal to verify and monitor (McNabb/ 
Whitfield 1998; Cheadle 1989). Share ownership has the potential to align the interest 
of employees with those of the firm. Additional reward is not the only key to this 
alignment, share ownership may also raise commitment and trust because the firms 
share results with the employees. This may have an impact on lower absenteeism, for 
instance (Brown/Fakhfakh/Sessions 1999). In addition, psychological ownership may 
be developed (Pierce/Rubenfeld/Morgan 1991; Pendleton, Wilson and Wright 1998) 
and peer pressures may develop to prevent under-performance of colleagues (Fitzroy/ 
Kraft 1987; Freeman/Kruse/Blasi 2004).
Determinants literature has selected several indicators to test these claims. Work-
places where individual output and performance is hard to measure because of the 
complexity and interdependence of work tasks may be observed in advanced manu-
facturing contexts, some service activities, and in creative occupations. There are a 
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range of measures which may be used to approach these indicators: the proportions of 
various groups of staff (such as professionals whose output is difficult to measure), 
the presence of automated technology, the complexity/interdependence of work 
tasks, and the proportion of highly-educated staff. These features might be proxied by 
the proportion of manual workers on the basis that manual work tends to be more 
readily measurable than much white collar work, the proportion of graduates in the 
workforce on the grounds that more highly qualified employees tend to perform rela-
tively complex work tasks, and the proportion of professionals on the basis that pro-
fessional work is especially difficult to monitor (for use of these proxies, see Pendle-
ton 1997; Festing et al.1999; Poutsma/de Nijs 2003). Another important determinant 
in the literature on financial participation is size of the workplace. The argument here 
is that monitoring costs increase in larger organisations, so size may be an important 
predictor of the adoption and use of financial participation, and indeed many studies 
have found this to be the case especially in relation to share ownership schemes (see 
for instance Pendleton et al. 2003). However, the problem here is that with the in-
crease in size more free rider effects may occur, and so the effects of size may be am-
biguous. The free rider problem is one of the reasons why determinants literature pre-
sents mixed results in relation to the agency perspective.
Human Resource perspective 
Although the agency argument is mentioned in connection with broad-based share 
plans, the literature and research on these plans takes much more of a human resource 
management perspective. In a critique on theories of the firm, Blair (1999) stated that 
in labour theory the principal-agent model is not directly applicable to the employ-
ment relationship especially not when firm-specific investments in human capital are 
involved. In simple principal-agent modelling the contract specifies outcomes and fees 
and after the contract is agreed the assumption is that in this asymmetrical relationship 
the principal will not influence or change the variables that influence the outcomes 
and hence the fee. In firm-specific investments in human capital by employees in the 
course of the employment relationship, the outcomes cannot be specified and man-
agement can change the conditions under which firm-specific investments in human 
capital can reach certain outcomes. The consequence of this reasoning is that firms 
will look for other arrangements beyond contract to bind employees in a long-term em-
ployment relationship to protect firm-specific investments by those employees. Ex-
pectations that Blair mentions in this respect are that firms will develop bundles of 
HRM strategies to protect these investments like development plans, corporate cul-
ture and ownership and control rights, hence employee share ownership.
Recent HRM literature provides grounds to expect that firms with financial par-
ticipation will develop such a bundle of HRM practices. An important part of this 
literature views financial participation schemes as part of a high-performance work 
system, composed of several, interacting HRM instruments (Becker/Huselid 1998). 
If employees are to accept a range of performance-enhancing managerial initiatives, 
it is arguable that they should receive a pay-off from any improvements in perform-
ance that might result. Equally, if employees are to share in the performance of the 
firm, it is arguable that they should actively contribute to performance outcomes. 
management revue, vol 16, issue 1, 2005   111 
We therefore expect to find firms with financial participation also having a range of 
other human resource management features, such as higher than average training ex-
penditure, comprehensive performance appraisal systems etc. 
The relationship between financial participation and training is of particular inter-
est. In the literature, it is argued that employees should have equal rights to owners 
and investors because employees also make firm-specific investments and incur 
potential opportunity costs from their investment (see Blair 1995, 1999). They bear 
risk in so far as management or owners may opportunistically capture the benefits 
resulting from employee investments. The consequence of this reasoning is that em-
ployees should receive a dividend on their investment in much the same way as private 
investors. Financial participation schemes signal to employees that the benefits of 
investments in training will be shared with employees. Equally, from the firm’s point of 
view, the use of financial participation helps to protect investments made by the firm in 
employee training. It raises the costs to employees of shirking (i.e. dismissal may lead to 
lower remuneration elsewhere) and of leaving the firm5. In so far as financial participa-
tion schemes frequently have deferral periods, it binds the employee to the firm in the 
medium term. To control this training effect we proxy this by the percentage of em-
ployees trained and the level of training budget as a proportion of the wage bill.
Methodology
The empirical analysis was performed using the data set of the Cranfield Network on 
European Human Resource CRANET-2000 (for details of the survey and Cranet 
Network see Brewster et al. 1994). We performed a secondary analysis on the data col-
lected in 1999/2000 in 14 European Member States. Cranet-E describes company 
practices and policies in human resource management of medium and large-scale or-
ganisations in the private sector (200 or more employees). The organisation could be 
the firm in its entirety or a relatively independent subsidiary. The data was collected 
using a mail survey directed at the head of personnel in representative national sam-
ples of organisations based in one of the fourteen EU countries (for a detailed de-
scription of the sampling procedure, see Pendleton et al. 2001). The unweighted dis-
tribution of the organisations between the fourteen countries is shown in Table 1. In 
the analysis, we used weights (Table 1) in order to compensate for unequal sampling 
probabilities due to a stratified (i.e. country) sampling design. A representative pan-
European picture was reached using the country’s proportion of large-scale enter-
prises (LSE), i.e. with 250+ employees, in the EU (European Observatory SME’s 
2002, Eurostat\EIM6). Nevertheless, the data cannot claim to be a fully reliable repre-
sentative picture of the European Union due to slightly different sampling procedures 
across countries. 
This study focused on the practice whereby organisations offer employees a 
form of share ownership by allocating shares or options to personnel. The question 
in the survey does not make a distinction between share allocation and the issue of 
                                                          
5  Except where financial participation is in use in similar firms. 
6  http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/lib-entrepreneurship/series_observatory.htm
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Table 1:  Distribution of cases by country 
COUNTRY Unweighted Unweighted Weighted 
 Count Col % Col % 
Austria 131 5.2 2,4 
Belgium 141 5.6 2,7 
Denmark 151 6.0 1.4 
Finland 131 5.2 13.3 
France 264 10.5 13.3 
Germany 415 16.6 33.9 
Greece 95 3.8 1.0 
Ireland 96 3.8 1.0 
Italy 60 2.4 6.8 
Netherlands 56 2.2 6.2 
Portugal 96 3.8 2.2 
Spain 184 7.3 7.6 
Sweden 156 6.2 2.3 
United Kingdom 530 21.1 17.8 
  Group total 2506 100.0 100.0 
options7. In the CRANET survey, the respondents indicated which categories of em-
ployees this type of financial participation applies to: management staff, professional 
and technical staff, clerical and administrative staff, and manual workers. Using these 
specific categories of employees, it is possible to determine not only whether an or-
ganisation is engaged in share ownership but also the extent to which its scheme goes 
beyond the level of management in the organisation. Following Pendleton et al. 
(2003), we therefore distinguished between organisations with a narrow-based share 
scheme (limited to less than 50% of the employees, mainly management staff) and 
those with a broad-based share option scheme open to more than 50% of the em-
ployees8.
Being dichotomous dependent variables, Narrow- and Broad-based share (op-
tion) schemes were analysed using logistic regression. These statistical models treat the 
                                                          
7  The original English questionnaire was translated into the languages of the various coun-
tries where the survey was held. In addition the questionnaire was translated back into 
English to highlight possible differences in national interpretation of concepts, terms and 
wording. The Cranet Team discussed these and came to an agreement that maximised 
comparability. The question on incidence of share schemes should therefore be read as 
schemes that offer bonds related to company shares. This broad category, therefore, cov-
ers  peculiar national-specific (wording of) schemes to make it comparable. For the sake 
of readability we use the term share schemes. 
8  In constructing these two indicators, Pendleton et al. (2003) took into account not only 
the specific categories of employees but also their proportional representation in the 
organisation (151-152). 
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predicted probability of the type of share option scheme occurring as a non-linear 
function of the independent variables. Positive coefficients (odd ratios) indicate that 
the specific category concerning the independent variable increases the probability of 
the scheme at hand, whereas a negative parameter signifies a decrease in this probabil-
ity. The rate of change, however, will depend on the position on the probability curve 
(see Long 1997).
Table 2: List of Independent Variables 
 Categories 
Broad-based profit-sharing 
Narrow-based profit-sharing 
0 ‘no’; 1 ‘yes’ 
0 ‘no’; 1 ‘yes’ 
EU states: UK, = reference category (refcat) 
France
Spain
Germany 
Other EU countries 
Headquarter (Multi)national: 1 ‘Nationally based company’ (refcat) 
2 ‘EU-based multinational corporation’ 
3 ‘US-based multinational corporation, USHQ’ 
4 ‘not EU and US based multinational corporation’ 
Interaction terms EU states*USHQ: United Kingdom*USHQ (refcat) 
France*USHQ
Spain*USHQ
Germany*USHQ 
Others*USHQ
Focus on International Markets 1 ‘National orientation’ (refcat) 
2 ‘European orientation’ 
3 ‘Global player’ 
Control variables 
Business Size 1 ‘200-499 employees’ (refcat) 
2 ‘500-999 employees’ 
3 ‘1000 plus employees’ 
Total Company Size 1 ‘200-499 employees’ (refcat) 
2 ‘500-999 employees’ 
3 ‘1000 plus employees’ 
Percentage of Professionals 1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
Percentage of Manuals 1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
Percentage of Employees trained 1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
Training-costs as proportion of Wage Bill 1 ‘0-1.5%’ (refcat) 
2 ’1.51-3.0%’ 
3 ’3.1%-highest’ 
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Table 2 presents an overview of the main independent variables and their categories. 
Our focus in this study was on the adoption of share schemes by corporations. Al-
though this type of payment scheme has distinct features compared with other profit-
sharing schemes, in practice these types of payment schemes may be conjoined (Pen-
dleton et al. 2001). We therefore incorporated the prevalence of profit-sharing 
schemes as control variables. 
We specified four large EU-countries to look for country-specific institutional ef-
fects: the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Germany. These countries also have 
satisfyingly high cell frequencies of multinationals using share schemes. Some of the 
independent variables have a number of missing cases. List-wise deletion would have 
led to an unacceptably low number of valid cases, so following Poutsma, Hendrickx, 
and Huijgen (2003), we included missing values as a separate category in the analysis. 
The indicator contrast was used for the independent variables, i.e. the contrasts within 
an independent variable were tested against a specific reference category. A significant 
effect for the ‘missing’ category indicates that missing cases are not random but relate 
to specific categories more than to others. It is, however, preferred that the ‘missing’ 
categories be non-significant. At least this procedure ensures that the parameter esti-
mates are based on as large a sample as possible.
Table 4 summarises the parameter estimates for the effects of the independent 
variables on the Narrow-based as well as for the Broad-based share schemes. Asterisks 
following the variable’s name indicate the significance of the variable. The chi-square 
values for each of the added blocks of independent variables can be found in Table 5. 
Results
Throughout the European Union a minority of companies have either a narrow- or a 
broad-based share scheme (Table 3). In the EU countries, the incidence of narrow-
based share schemes (14.0%) was comparable with the incidence of broad-based share 
schemes (14.1%). The incidence of both types of share schemes appeared to be asso-
ciated somewhat negatively, i.e. a Phi-coefficient of -.164 (weighted, p<.001). This im-
plies that both share schemes are separate phenomena. 
Table 3: Incidence of share schemes in EU-countries (%) (weighted) 
Type of share  United 
Kingdom
France Spain Germany Other 
EU
countries
EU
countries
No share-options 
scheme 55.0 61.1 80.6 80.5 75.0 71.9 
Narrow-based share-
options scheme 15.7 19.8 14.2 10.3 14.8 14.0 
Broad-based share-
options scheme 29.3 19.2 5.2 9.2 10.2 14.1 
This univariate analysis table shows that the incidence of share schemes followed the 
hypothesised pattern. The incidence was highest in the UK followed by France. Lower 
incidences were found in Spain and Germany. A high incidence of broad-based 
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schemes was found in the UK followed by France. Lower incidences of both schemes 
were found in Germany.
Determinant factors for Narrow- and Broad-based share schemes 
In this section, we present the effects of the independent variables according to the 
hypotheses formulated. A general overview of the Chi-Squares of the hypothesised ef-
fects are summarised in Table 4 for the Narrow-based and Broad-based share 
schemes. The parameter estimates, i.e. the odds-ratios, are summarised in Table 5. 
Table 4:  Chi-Square values of the terms 
  dfa Narrow-based 
share
Broad-based
share
Broad-based profit 1 1.16 35.75** 
Narrow-based profit 1 13.89** .96 
HQ_MNC 3 49.93** 31.61** 
EU states 4 29.66** 83.14** 
Interaction EU states * USHQ 4 5.25 18.87** 
International Market Orientation a 3 3.51 5.56 
Control variables    
Business size 
Total Corporation size a
Percentage manuals a
Percentage professionals a
2
3
3
3
21.62**
1.64
5.98
3.54
4.98
11.33**
3.95
.63
Proportion trained employees a
Training of budget  as proportion 
of wages a
3
3
1.33
1.15
13.69**
4.60
 Model Chi-square 33 181.00** 312.03** 
 N  2367 2319 
-2 Log Likelihood
 1781.38 1660.04 
Percentage correct 
predictions
85.7 85.8 
 Nagelkerke’s R-Square  .13 .22 
* significant at .05       ** significant at .01 
a including the missing values categories 
In the discussion on ‘Anglo-Saxonisation’ and HRM practices transfer, we predicted 
that not only employee share schemes but also other calculative HRM practices would 
conjoin (Gooderham et al. 1999). Pendleton et al. (2001) noted that in practice share 
schemes go together with profit-sharing schemes. Our results confirm this. However, 
the results show that profit-sharing only increased the probability of organisations also 
having a share scheme (i.e. the odds-ratio is greater than 1) for the same organisational 
group. The incidence of narrow-based profit-sharing only increased the presence of 
narrow-based share schemes, whereas the presence of broad-based share schemes was 
only increased by the incidence of broad-based profit-sharing schemes. This consis-
tency across different types of payment schemes validates the distinction between nar-
row-based and broad-based calculative practices. 
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Table 5:  Odds-ratios for the characteristics of corporations with a Narrow-based 
or a Broad-based share options schemea Logistic Regression 
 Categories Narrow-based Broad-based 
Broad-based profit-sharing 
Narrow-based profit-sharing 
0 ‘no’; 1 ‘yes’ 
0 ‘no’; 1 ‘yes’ 
1.19
1.95**
2.53**
1.23
HeadQuarter_MNC
1 ‘Nationally based company’ (refcat) 
2 ‘EU-based MNC’ 
3 ‘US-based MNC, USHQ’ 
4 ‘Not EU or US based MNC’ 
**
2.10**
8.08**
1.57
**
2.15**
2.38*
.62
EU states:  
UK (refcat) 
France
Spain
Germany 
Others
**
1.38
1.09
.39**
.84
**
.25**
.09**
.23**
.26**
Interaction EU states*USHQ 
United Kingdom*USHQ (refcat) 
France*USHQ
Spain*USHQ
Germany*USHQ 
Others*USHQ 
n.s.
.58
.27
.44
.90
**
.44
.98
13.91**
.53
Focus on International Markets  
1 ‘National orientation’ (refcat) 
2 ‘European market orientation’ 
3 ‘Global player’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
.82
1.15
.93
n.s.
.66
.88
.04
Business Size  
1 ‘200-499 employees’ (refcat) 
2 ‘500-999 employees’ 
3 ‘1000 plus employees’ 
**
.66*
1.52**
n.s.
1.27
1.45*
Total Company Size  
1 ‘200-499 employees’ (refcat) 
2 ‘500-999 employees’ 
3 ‘1000 plus employees’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
1.37
1.10
1.02
**
.71
1.36
.87
Percentage of Professionals  
1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
1.20
.75
1.24
n.s.
1.03
1.22
.97
Percentage of Manuals  
1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
1.13
1.53
1.61
n.s.
1.19
.79
1.11
Percentage of Employees 
trained 1 ‘0-30%’ (refcat) 
2 ’31-60%’ 
3 ’61-100%’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
.82
.90
.94
**
1.80**
1.77**
1.64*
Proportion training of Wage Bill  
1 ‘0-1.5%’ (refcat) 
2 ’1.51-3.0%’ 
3 ’3.1%-highest’ 
4 ‘missing’ 
n.s.
.90
.86
.83
n.s.
1.37
1.45
1.53*
Constant  .07** .10** 
* significant at .05             ** significant at .01 
a Odd ratios >1 contribute positively to the dependent. Odd ratios <1 contribute negatively to the dependent 
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An overview of the findings for the hypotheses concerning the perspectives is pre-
sented in Table 6. In the institutional perspective, the findings show that the specified 
EU countries with their different institutional arrangements played an important role 
in the incidences of both types of share schemes. The different institutional arrange-
ments affected the prevalence of both share schemes, although more extensively for 
broad-based than for narrow-based share schemes. With regard to a possible Anglo-
Saxonisation effect, however, the presence of a US subsidiary had a general and 
prominent effect on the prevalence of the narrow-based and broad-based share 
schemes.
Table 6:  Summary of the findings of the hypotheses for the perspectives 
Formulated hypothesis                                                expected  
Narrow-based 
Share
Broad-based
Share
1. USHQ     more likely Yes Yes 
2. UK compared to other regions  more likely Partly Yes 
3. Germany     less likely Yes Yes 
4. International Market Orientation  more likely No  
Our first hypothesis predicted that being a subsidiary of a US MNC would affect the 
probabilities of having narrow- and broad-based share schemes. The results confirm 
the hypothesised effect, i.e. being a subsidiary of a US MNC (US-based MNC, USHQ) 
generally increased the odds of the narrow-based and broad-based schemes. The odds 
were 8.08 (Wald statistic 40.74, p < .001) and 2.38 (Wald statistic 4.20, p < .040) re-
spectively. Especially for the narrow-based share scheme, the odds were raised promi-
nently by US MNCs. A MNC-effect was also found for the EU-based MNCs, al-
though it was less prominent. The odds for both share schemes were increased for 
these EU-based MNCs compared with the nationally based companies. Seemingly, 
EU-based MNCs mimic the management practices of US MNCs.
Although the institutional effects described below show that German companies 
generally were less likely to adopt a broad-based share scheme, a US MNC effect never-
theless appeared to be – present and very prominent – in Germany. The odds increased 
by 13.91 (Wald statistic 9.3; p < .002). Apparently, US-based MNCs in Germany do 
adopt the broad-based share scheme more than US-based MNCs in the UK. These 
findings support our first hypothesis on narrow-based and broad-based share schemes.
Based on the differences between the countries specified (i.e. following the insti-
tutional perspective), we hypothesised substantial differences between the countries in 
the incidence of the share schemes. As predicted, the results show that with regard to 
broad-based schemes, the continental countries like France, Spain and Germany score 
lower than the United Kingdom, i.e. the reference category. Likewise, Germany 
scored lower than the United Kingdom for the narrow-based share schemes. How-
ever, the incidence of narrow-based schemes was only significantly lower in Germany. 
In France, Spain and other EU countries, the incidence of narrow-based share schemes  
was equivalent to the United Kingdom. We therefore found our second hypothesis to 
be partially supported, to the extent that the United Kingdom has the highest – or at 
least equal – incidence of share schemes to the other EU countries. In particular, there 
was a much higher incidence of broad-based share schemes in the United Kingdom 
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than elsewhere in the EU. Spain scored as high as the UK on the incidence of narrow-
based schemes. France also scored higher than Germany and as high as the United 
Kingdom on narrow-based schemes. We can fully accept our third hypotheses stating 
that Germany scored lowest regarding both types of schemes (Hypothesis 3). 
Interpreting the agency perspective in the relationship between multinational 
corporate headquarters and the management of subsidiaries, we expected that being a 
global player as a business unit of a US MNC would have a positive effect on the inci-
dence of narrow-based schemes. This cannot be confirmed by our results. A closer 
look at the relationship between the variables US (and EU) MNC and the interna-
tional orientation variable reveals that the correlation is strong suggesting that subsidi-
aries of multinationals already tend to be global players. Additional analysis showed 
that the separate – positive – effect of this independent variable disappeared when 
controlling for the EU and US MNC – effect. This suggests that the EU and US vari-
able described in the step before does indeed cover the international orientation effect 
to a large extent. 
Control variables 
Of the control variables, only size of the business unit and the proportion of employ-
ees trained appear to be significant contributors. Business unit size increased the odds 
for broad-based schemes. This may be interpreted as a possible scale effect as well as a 
possible agency effect. However, total company size was not a significant predictor, 
suggesting that scale factors are less important. At least we may say that free rider 
problems may not prevent the establishment of schemes in larger organisations. Al-
though not explicitly expected, business unit size also increased the odds for narrow-
based schemes. This may be interpreted as an additional effect marking the impor-
tance of the organisation. Corporate headquarters and owners may use these schemes 
more often for management of larger units reflecting the importance of the unit. 
The results show, as expected, that the Percentage of Employees Trained had a 
positive effect on the probability of broad-based schemes; the higher the Percentage 
of Employees Trained the higher the probability of broad-based schemes. On the 
other hand, we found no evidence for the expected relation between the Proportion 
of the Wage Bill spent on Training and the proportion of broad-based schemes. Al-
though both indicators are very rough indicators for the nature of training (general 
and specific) we can interpret this finding as giving some support to the firm-specific 
skills argument. A higher budget for training may indicate higher expenditure for 
training provided by external trainers and consultants. This training may be directed to 
more general skills than firm-specific skills. Firm-specific on the job training may not 
be covered by explicit budgets. A higher proportion of the workforce may indicate 
more on the job training of firm-specific skills. Since the budget variable is not corre-
lated to the workforce-proportion variable we may suggest that the latter indicates 
firm-specific skills training. 
The predictors concerning the composition of the workforce (high percentage of 
professionals and high percentage of manual workers) appear not to contribute to the 
phenomenon. The results show that the proportion of professionals and manuals 
yielded no significant effect on the probability of broad-based schemes.
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Conclusions and discussion 
Some general conclusions can be drawn from this comparative study. First, the coun-
tries with their different institutional arrangements and US multinationals played an 
important role on the extent to which share schemes are available to narrow and 
broader categories of employees in European companies. The different institutional 
arrangements affected the prevalence of both types of share schemes, although more 
extensively for broad-based than for narrow-based share schemes. The largest effect 
comes from multinationals, especially those based in the US. US multinationals tended 
to introduce narrow-based share schemes more than broad-based schemes in Europe. 
European multinationals tended to mimic US practices. This supports the so-called 
Anglo-Saxonisation effect as found by Ferner and Quintanilla (1998). They stated that 
tensions arise between the requirements of ‘globalised’ operations and the characteris-
tics MNCs have adopted from their home country environment. MNCs respond to 
such tensions by adopting various adaptation strategies, the most important if which 
may be termed ‘Anglo-Saxonisation’: a convergence of MNC behaviour around a 
model typical of highly internationalised British or US MNCs.
Second, the results also show that this convergence effect applies to narrow-
based schemes more than broad-based schemes. This suggests that the adoption of 
narrow-based schemes fits more easily into a universalist convergence perspective.
Third, this contribution supports the institutional perspective of certain HRM 
practices and sets out the diversity of institutional arrangements that may influence the 
adoption of HRM practices. It highlights the varieties of capitalism in Europe by the 
fact of the existence of distinct national financial participation frameworks. These 
frameworks determined the nature and incidence of broad-based schemes to a large 
extent and the nature and incidence of narrow-based schemes to a lesser extent.
Fourth, the contribution suggests that the Agency and Human Resource perspec-
tive provide some determinants of share schemes. However, the indicators used were 
very rough and there is a need for further exploration. There are also grounds for an 
imitation and rent extraction perspective especially for narrow-based schemes. We 
discovered the possibility of an additional explanation for broad-based schemes com-
ing from the human resource perspective. Training affects the use of broad-based 
share schemes. These results are in line with other research results in this domain 
(Pendleton et al. 2003). However, a more detailed analysis is needed of studies into 
how companies protect firm-specific skills and the contribution of employee share 
schemes and profit-sharing schemes to this.
There are some important drawbacks to this study that have to be taken into ac-
count when taking research in this area further. Anglo-Saxonisation does have a much 
broader meaning than simply having US management, despite the fact that US man-
agement appeared to have a direct and an indirect effect on the likelihood of having a 
narrow-based and broad-based share scheme, respectively. However, when introduc-
ing a broader scope of Anglo-Saxon HRM practices, it is important to look for diver-
sity in the adoption of some or parts of the listed HRM practices in certain institu-
tional environments. Second, we could not distinguish between types of schemes. 
Since a broad range of schemes is covered that have substantial differences in nature 
120 Erik Poutsma, Paul E. M. Ligthart, Roel Schouteten: Employee Share Schemes in Europe 
and effect, the relevance of certain theoretical perspectives for some of these plans is 
questionable. In general the literature suffers from a lack of comparison of different 
schemes. The schemes are also likely to be country-specific in design depending on 
regulatory and taxation differences. There is a need for further comparative research. 
Third, the proxy value of the independent variables used in this study are rough indi-
cators. On the one hand, the unobtrusive measurements enabled an interesting com-
parative study of companies among EU regions, on the other hand, the validity of 
some measurements can be questioned. Given their effects as demonstrated already in 
this study, it would be worthwhile studying more precisely the relationship between 
the proxies used and their inferred meanings.
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